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By Edward L Flippen
N ot too long ago, the electric deregulation train appeared to have gathered steam across most of the country and seemed unstoppable. Recently, 
however, electric deregulation appears to have lost pace, 
and in some quarters what little accomplishment there has 
been is being rolled back or stalled. Certainly, not every 
state jumped on the train. States such as Idaho, Wyoming, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia have had 
little incentive to deregulate. The average price their 
citizens pay for electricity is in the range of $0.05/kWh or 
less compared to prices 80-100 percent higher in 
California, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and New Hampshire. 
But even in states where there have been economic and 
policy incentives to deregulate, much has happened in the 
last few years to stifle deregulation.
The California energy crisis left legislators and regulators 
in the states that have not deregulated with grave concerns 
about whether deregulation even works, much less whether 
it will produce consumer benefits. Rates for customers of 
San Diego Gas and Electric increased 100 to 200 percent 
in 2000, and Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern 
California Edison had to pay for wholesale purchases of 
electricity at prices that were up to five times greater than 
what they were able to recover from their retail customers. 
All in all, a California deregulation plan that took five years 
to develop took only months to collapse. And, now, the 
state of California (through its Department of Water 
Resources) owes billions for long-term obligations it 
incurred to purchase electricity for its residents when 
California utilities were unable to meet their obligations.o
As if the combination of low cost states trying to holdJ o
onto regulation and the California fiasco were not enough, 
along comes the collapse of Enron. Enron was the 'poster 
child' of electric deregulation. It promoted greater 
competition in electric power and battled state regulators 
that opposed deregulation. However, the company 
overstated profits with allegedly fraudulent accounting
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and, certainly, dubious accounting such as booking the' y o o
entire value of energy future trades as revenue. (Trading 
firms typically only book the spread between purchases 
and sales, not the whole trade). The result was artificially 
inflated values that, together with loose accounting 
practices, ultimately caused its demise.
Mix the ingredients of low cost states wanting to hold 
onto regulation in their states, the California debacle, and 
the collapse of Enron, and it would be easy to conclude 
that electric deregulation is doomed. Yet, just the opposite 
should be the case. Not a single customer has beeno
without electric service because of Enron. And the lessons 
from the California crisis tell us how better to model 
deregulation. For sure, states must make certain there is a 
balance in the supply and demand for electricity at the 
time of deregulation (California had no net increase in 
generating facilities over a 10 year period in which 
demand increased by approximately 25 per cent). Equally 
important, states must allow retail electric distribution 
utilities to enter into long-term supply arrangements witho I I J o
deregulated generation plants. (California encouraged its 
incumbent electric utilities to divest their generation,o 7
capped their retail rates, and prohibited them from 
entering into long-term supply contracts). The net result 
was that the incumbents were exposed to spot market 
volatility and squeezed to the point of insolvency.
. Regardless of California and Enron, we know from the 
Australian and UK electric deregulation experience, as 
well as the US telecommunications experience, that 
deregulation drives prices down. We also know from the 
US telecommunications experience that deregulation 
produces quantum leaps in technology advances. And we 
know from our experience with airline, trucking, and 
railroad deregulation that competition reduces cost and 
increases efficiencies.
Deregulation of anything faces 'bumps in the road'. But 
when the bumps are gone, prices are lower and services 
are better, relatively speaking. The only thing we do not 
know is whether politicians can take the heat caused by 
the bumps. If they can, electric deregulation will produce 
lower prices, better service, and add value to the global 
competitive position of US firms. If they can't, the 
continued confusion and uncertainty in the electric power 
industry will be a drag on the US economy. Then everyone 
will lose. @
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